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Abstract
We establish completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is
provable if and only if its embedding into minimal logic, mFOL, is uniformly valid under the
Brouwer Heyting Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics, the intended semantics of iFOL and mFOL.
Our proof is intuitionistic and provides an effective procedure Prf that converts uniform minimal
evidence into a formal first-order proof. We have implemented Prf . Uniform validity is defined
using the intersection operator as a universal quantifier over the domain of discourse and atomic
predicates. Formulas of iFOL that are uniformly valid are also intuitionistically valid, but not
conversely. Our strongest result requires the Fan Theorem; it can also be proved classically by
showing that Prf terminates using Ko¨nig’s Theorem.
The fundamental idea behind our completeness theorem is that a single evidence term evd wit-
nesses the uniform validity of a minimal logic formula F. Finding even one uniform realizer
guarantees validity because Prf(F, evd) builds a first-order proof of F, establishing its uniform
validity and providing a purely logical normalized realizer.
We establish completeness for iFOL as follows. Friedman showed that iFOL can be embedded
in minimal logic (mFOL) by his A-transformation, mapping formula F to FA. If F is uniformly
valid, then so is FA, and by our completeness theorem, we can find a proof of FA in minimal
logic. Then we intuitionistically prove F from FFalse, i.e. by taking False for A and for ⊥ of
mFOL. Our result resolves an open question posed by Beth in 1947.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
approaches to completeness We introduce a new approach to completeness questions. It
provides the first intuitionistic completeness proof for the intended semantics of intuitionistic logic,
a question investigated by Beth [6] starting in 1947 and open ever since.1 Our result provides an
answer, however not the one expected by comparison with Go¨del’s completeness proof for classical
first-order logic. We briefly review previous completeness results below.
We came to our approach because we use on a daily basis the fact that from constructive
proofs of a theorem in computational type theory we can automatically extract programs that
meet the specification given by the theorem. These polymorphically typed programs are evidence
for validity of the theorem. For intuitionistic first-order logic (iFOL), a subtheory of type theory,
the extracted programs are uniform witnesses for validity of the theorems. We call them uniform
realizers. We can express this uniformity by a universal quantifier defined using the intersection
1See Troelstra [48] where he states on page 12 “The standard informal interpretation of logical operators
in intuitionistic logic is the so-called proof-interpretation or Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK-
interpretation for short).” Brouwer proposed several interpretations of negation (see [50]), so minimal logic represents
the stable intended core from which it is possible to explain the “ex falso quodlibet” rule as we show.
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type in computational type theory [1]. Moreover for first-order logic we know that the realizers are
not only uniform, but they are in normal form and consist entirely of logical operators. This is a
basic fact about the extraction of computational content (see [11, 32]).
In many cases we could see clearly the proof structure in the realizers. This led us to conjecture
that iFOL is complete with respect to uniform semantics because uniformity eliminates terms
that are not essentially built from the logical operators. It was a longer road to establish this
in detail, and we report succinctly on that journey here, giving all of the technical details. In a
longer forthcoming article we will provide more motivation, examples, and practical applications
under the proposed title Intuitionistic Completeness of First-Order Logic with Respect to Uniform
Evidence Semantics. There we also explicitly prove some of the basic results about extraction in
the simple setting of iFOL.
The common approach to first-order completeness is based on systematic search for counter
examples to a conjecture, and validity of the conjecture is the reason the search fails – halting with
a proof. This approach is well illustrated in Smullyan’s enduringly valued monograph First-Order
Logic [45] and Fitting’s monograph [15], both going back to the work of Beth [6, 7].2 Like all
other classical proofs of completeness, these are not constructively valid. We take a very different
approach, effectively converting uniform evidence for validity into a proof. We do this by building
objects called evidence structures that reveal the evidence term layer by layer. For instance, when
we see evidence of the form λ(x.b(x)) for a formula A ⇒ B, then we add to the context of the
evidence structure the assumption that x : A and continue by analyzing b(x) after normalizing it
by symbolic computation. This computation reveals the operations that must be performed on the
context to expose more of the evidence term b(x). For example, if the assumption A is A1&A2,
then we decompose x into x1 : A1 and x2 : A2 and substitute the pair < x1, x2 > into the logical
operator mentioning x in the evidence term we are analyzing. Because the evidence is uniform,
the normalization process eliminates any operators on non-logical terms. We can thus convert the
operators on evidence terms to proof steps in first-order minimal logic.
Our realizers are effectively computable functions operating on data types; we call this approach
Brouwer realizability or evidence semantics. We do not rely on Church’s Thesis for any of these
results, and according to Kleene [23, 46], our use of the Fan Theorem precludes it.3
We hope that our results will add more weight to the notion that there is a deep connection
between proving a theorem and writing a program. We have long stressed this idea in papers
treating proofs as programs [1, 3, 11] and conversely programs as proofs, additionally in papers
treating formal constructive mathematics as a programming language [9, 11] where types subsume
data types. Here we are treating iFOL as an abstract programming language where formulas are
specifications given by dependent types. We build the proof from the program/data type which is
a uniform Brouwer realizer.
intuitionistic model theory This article contributes to an intuitionistic model theory as pro-
posed by Beth in 1947 [6] and greatly advanced by Per Martin-Lo¨f [32, 33]. Beth’s methods led to
Beth models and Kripke models whose computational meaning is not as strong as in the realizabil-
ity tradition, even given Veldman’s intuitionistic completeness theorem for Kripke models [51]. We
work in the realizability tradition started by Kleene, developed further by Martin-Lo¨f, extended
and implemented by the PRL Group as reported in the book Implementing Mathematics [11], by
the Coq Group as reported in [5], the Gothenberg Group reported in the book Programming in
Martin-Lo¨f ’s Type Theory [38], the Minlog Group as reported in Proof Theory at Work: Program
Development in the Minlog System [4], and in numerous doctoral dissertations and articles many
2Beth invented semantic tableau as a bridge from semantics to proofs; we use uniform realizers and their evidence
structures.
3The Computational Type Theory which Nuprl implements was designed in 1984 to use an open-ended notion of
effective computability from the start [11].
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of which are cited in [1]. This is the tradition framing and motivating our completeness results.
The semantic tradition is grounded in precise knowledge of the underlying computation system
and its efficient implementation made rigorous by researchers in programming languages. Our
operational semantics of evidence terms follows the method of structured operational semantics of
Plotkin [41, 42]. The few basic results about programming language semantics we mention can
be found in the comprehensive textbooks on the subject [37, 39]. Many results from this theory
are now being formalized in proof assistants and applied directly to building better languages and
systems [40].
1.2 Background
Classical first-order logic, FOL Tarski’s semantics [47] for classical first-order formulas faith-
fully captures their intuitive truth-functional interpretation. Go¨del proved his classical completeness
theorem for first-order logic with respect to this intended semantics, showing that an FOL formula
is provable if and only if truth functionally valid. This has become a fundamental result in logic
which is widely taught to undergraduates. There are many excellent textbook proofs such as [45].
Intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL The BHK semantics for iFOL is the intended semantics,
faithful to the intuitionistic conception of knowledge. In contrast to the classical situation, there
has been no intuitionistic completeness proof with respect to the intended semantics. To explain
this contrast, we look briefly at the origin of intuitionism. At nearly the same time that a truth-
functional approach to logic was being developed by Frege [16] and Russell [44], circa 1907, Brouwer
[19, 50] imagined a very different meaning for mathematical statements and thus for logic itself.
Brouwer’s meaning is grounded in the mental constructions that cause an individual mathematician
to know that mathematical objects can be created with certain properties.
Brouwer developed a very rich informal model of computation in terms of which he could inter-
pret most concepts and theorems of mathematics, including from set theory (see [50]). Brouwer’s
approach anticipated a precise meaning that Church, Turing, and now legions of computer scien-
tists give to mathematical statements whose meaning is grounded in computations executed by
modern digital computers. Brouwer’s intuitive interpretation has come to be known among lo-
gicians as Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics when applied to formal intuitionistic
logical calculi, as first done by Heyting [20] and Kolmogorov [24]. In 1945 Kleene [22, 46] invented
his realizability semantics for intuitionistic number theory in order to connect Brouwer’s informal
notion of computability to the precise theory of partial recursive functions. He used indexes of
general recursive functions as realizers, and by 1952 [21] he viewed realizability as a formal account
of BHK semantics under the assumption of Church’s Thesis.
By 1982 Martin-Lo¨f [32, 33] building on the work of Kleene refined the BHK approach and
raised it to the level of a semantic method for constructive logics grounded in structured operational
semantics [42]. Martin-Lo¨f often referres to BHK as the propositions as types principle. In computer
science other terminology is “proofs as programs” or the “Curry-Howard isomorphism”. Already in
1970 Martin-Lo¨f proposed using Brouwer’s analysis of bar induction as the meaning of Π11 statements
and developed a constructive version of completeness for classical first-order logic [31] based on a
topological model of Borel sets in the Cantor Space.
This semantics plays an important role in the business of building correct by construction soft-
ware and in the semantics of the constructive logics such as Computational Type Theory (CTT)
[1, 11], Intuitionistic Type Theory (ITT) [32, 33, 38], Intensional-ITT [8, 34, 38], the Calculus
of Inductive Constructions (CIC)[5], Minlog [4], and Logical Frameworks such as Edinburgh LF
[18]. All of these logics are implemented by proof assistants such as Agda, Coq, MetaPRL, Minlog,
Nuprl, and Twelfth among others.
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Previous completeness theorems A constructive completeness theorem for iFOL with respect
to intuitionistic validity is a very strong result because it says that if we know that a formula is
valid, thus true in every possible model, then we can effectively find a first-order proof based on that
knowledge. This seems highly unlikely as the sixty four year long investigation of the problem has
shown. In all previous work, the idea is to try to construct a proof and use the evidence for truth
to argue that the proof construction must succeed. Classically this requires Ko¨nig’s Lemma, and
constructively some use of Markov’s Principle or the Fan Theorem or something of that kind. Those
efforts do not try to use the information that ∀M : Model. |= F to build the proof. Nevertheless,
our results show exactly how to build the proof from uniform evidence for validity, which is a single
object. Moreover, we can actually execute our result using a tactic executed by the Nuprl prover
[11, 1, 26]. We give that procedure in the Appendix.
Over the last fifty years there have been numerous deep and evocative efforts to formulate
completeness theorems for the intuitionistic propositional calculus and for intuitionistic first-order
logic modeled after Go¨del’s Theorem [13, 14, 25, 31, 51, 36]. Some efforts led to apparently more
technically tractable semantic alternatives to BHK such as Beth models [7, 51], Kripke models [27],
topological models [12, 17, 47, 43, 31], intuitionistic model theoretic validity [49], and provability
logic [2]. Dummett [14] discusses completeness issues extensively. The value of developing a precise
mathematical semantics for intuitionistic mathematics in the spirit of Tarski’s work dates at least
from Beth 1947 [6] with technical progress by 1957 [7]. So the completeness issue has been identified
yet unsettled for sixty four years. An important early attempt to base completeness on BKH is
the (nonconstructive) work of La¨uchli [28, 30] who stressed the notion of uniformity as important.
None of these efforts provides a constructive completeness theorem faithful to BHK semantics
(a.k.a. Brouwer realizability) either for the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) or for the
full predicate calculus. We do.
The closest correspondingly faithful constructive completeness theorem for intuitionistic validity
is by Friedman in 1975 (presented in [49]), and the closest classical proof for the Brouwer-Heyting-
Kolmogorov (propositions as types/proofs as terms/proofs as programs) semantics for intuitionistic
first-order logic is from 1998 by Artemov using provability logic [2]. Results suggest how delicate
completeness theorems are since constructive completeness with respect to full intuitionistic validity
contradicts Church’s Thesis [25, 49] and implies Markov’s Principle as well [35, 36].4
1.3 Summary of Results
Results in this article We first review evidence semantics. 5 Using evidence semantics, we then
introduce the idea of uniform validity, a concept central to our results and one that is also classically
meaningful. This concept provides an effective tool for semantics because we can establish uniform
validity by exhibiting a single polymorphic object. For example, the propositional formula A ⇒ A
is uniformly valid exactly when there is an object in the intersection of all evidence types for this
formula for each possible choice of A among the type of propositions, P. We write this intersection
as ∀[A : P].A⇒ A or as
⋂
A : P.A⇒ A.6 In this case, given the extensional equality of functions,
the polymorphic identity function λ(x.x) is the one and only object in the intersection. So the
witness for uniform validity like the witness for provability, can be provided by a single object.7
Truth tables do this for classical propositional logic. Unlike for classical first-order logic, there are
4Church’s Thesis is not an issue for us because we do not assume it.
5We can extend this semantics to classical logic if we allow oracle computations [10] to justify the law of excluded
middle, P∨ ∼P , with an operator magic(P ).We make some observations about classical logic based on this classical
evidence semantics.
6We work in a predicative metatheory, therefore the type of all propositions is stratified into orders or levels,
written Pi. For these results we can ignore the level of the type or just write Pi.
7Contrast this with the kind of evidence need for classical or intuitionistic model theoretic validity. In those cases,
we need a whole class of models to witness validity of a single formula.
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single witnesses for the validity of all uniformly valid first-order formulas; for example, it will be
clear after we provide the evidence semantics that the polymorphic term λ(h.λ(x.λ(p.h(< x, p >))))
establishes the uniform minimal (logic) validity of
∼ ∃x.P (x)⇒ ∀x.(∼P (x))
hence the uniform intuitionistic and classical validity as well.
Another important observation about uniform validity is that the formulas of first-order logic
that are provable intuitionistically and minimally are uniformly valid. It is also noteworthy that the
law of excluded middle is not uniformly valid in either constructive or classical evidence semantics.
Uniform validity also raises the semantic problem that forces us to consider minimal logic first.
Consider the intuitionistically valid assertion False ⇒ A for any proposition A. One semantic
object that witnesses uniform validity is λ(x.x), and other witnesses for uniform validity include
any constant functions, say λ(x.17) or even a diverging term such as div. The claim being made
is that if x belongs to the evidence type for False, then 17 or div belongs to the evidence type
for A.8 This claim is vacuously true since no element can be evidence for [False] whose evidence
is the empty type. From the constant function with value 17, λ(x.17), we cannot reconstruct the
proof. In minimal logic, we don’t have the atomic propositional constant False, we use instead the
arbitrary propositional constant ⊥ whose interpretation allows non-empty types as well as empty
ones. For the same reason, avoiding vacuous hypotheses, we require that all domains of discourse
for minimal logic can be non-empty.
Discussion Our results also suggest why completeness with respect to satisfiability in all con-
structive models, let alone all intuitionistic models, is unlikely (even impossible according to Mc-
Carty [35, 36]); such completeness is unlikely because we show that provability captures exactly
uniform validity, an intuitively smaller collection of formulas than those constructively valid. Never-
theless, uniform validity is extremely useful in practice when thinking about purely logical formulas
precisely because it corresponds exactly to proof and yet is an entirely semantic notion based on
the intended BHK semantics, the semantics that enables strong connections to computer science.
2 The main theorems
Definition 1. A first order language L is a symbol D and a finite set of relation symbols {Ri|i ∈ I}
with given arities {ni|i ∈ I}. First order formulas, F(L), over L are defined as usual. The variables
in a formula (which range over D) are taken from a fixed set Var = {di |i ∈ N}. Negation ¬ψ can
be defined to be ψ ⇒ False. The first order formulas of minimal logic 9, MF(L), are the formulas
in F(L) that do not use either negation or False.
In type theory, the propositions, P, are identified with types. A non-empty type is a true
proposition and members of the type are the evidence for the truth of the proposition. An empty
type provides no evidence and represents a false proposition.
Definition 2. A structure M for L is a mapping that assigns to D a type M(D) and assigns to
each Ri a term of type M(D)
ni → P. We write S(L) for the type10 of structures for L. If M ∈ S(L)
and x ∈M(D) then M [d := x] is an extended structure that maps the variable d to the term x.
8We can use the fixed point combinator, say Y or fix to define div. For instance, fix(λ(x.x)) computes to itself,
where fix is an operator such as the Y combinator λ(f.ap(λ(x.ap(f ;ap(x;x)));λ(x.ap(f ;ap(x;x))))).
9The usual definition of minimal logic includes a designated constant ⊥ and defines weak negation as ψ ⇒⊥. We
merely view ⊥ as one of the atomic relation symbols Ri with arity ni = 0.
10Since we work in type theory we always use types rather than sets.
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Definition 3. Given M ∈ S(L) that has been extended to map the variables V0 ⊆ Var into M(D),
we extend the mapping M to all formulas in F(L) with free variables in V0 by:
M(False) = Void
M(Ri(v1, . . . , vni)) = M(Ri)(M(v1), . . . ,M(vni))
M(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = M(ψ1)×M(ψ2)
M(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = M(ψ1) +M(ψ2)
M(ψ1 ⇒ ψ2) = M(ψ1)→M(ψ2)
M(¬ψ) = M(ψ ⇒ False)
M(∀v. ψ) = x :D → (M [v := x])(ψ)
M(∃v. ψ) = x :D × (M [v := x])(ψ)
Thus, anyM ∈ S(L) assigns a typeM(ψ) to a sentence (a formula with no free variables) ψ ∈ F(L).
M(ψ) is synonymous with the proposition M |= ψ, and the members of type M(ψ) are the evidence
for M |= ψ.
Definition 4. A sentence ψ ∈ F(L) is valid if
∀M ∈ S(L).M |= ψ
Evidence for the validity of ψ is a function of type M : S(L) → M(ψ) that computes, for each
M ∈ S(L), evidence for M |= ψ.
A sentence ψ ∈ F(L) is uniformly valid if there is one term that is a member of all the types
M(ψ) for M ∈ S(L). Such a term is a member of the intersection type
⋂
M∈S(L)
M(ψ)
We write an intersection type
⋂
x∈T P (x) as a proposition using the notation ∀[x : T ]. P (x). The
square brackets indicate that evidence for the proposition ∀[x : T ]. P (x) is uniform and does not
depend on the choice of x.
To summarize:
ψ is valid ≡ ∀M ∈ S(L).M |= ψ
ψ is uniformly valid(ψ) ≡ ∀[M :S(L)].M |= ψ
We write ⊢IL ψ to say that there is a proof of ψ in intuitionistic logic and ⊢ML ψ to say that there
is a proof of ψ in minimal logic. From a proof in intuitionistic logic of any proposition we can con-
struct evidence for the proposition. Automated proof assistants like Agda,Coq,MetaPRL,Minlog,
and Nuprl can construct the evidence automatically. We observe, and can easily prove, that the
evidence constructed from an intuitionistic proof of a first order formula ψ ∈ F(L) is actually
evidence that ψ is uniformly valid. Our main theorem states that for formulas of minimal logic the
converse is also true: a uniformly valid formula is provable.
Theorem 1. For any ψ ∈ MF(L),
∀[M :S(L)].M |= ψ ⇔ ⊢ML ψ.
Using Friedman’s A-transformation [29], we can derive from Theorem 1 a corresponding com-
pleteness theorem for intuitionistic logic.
Corollary 1. For any ψ ∈ F(L),
∀[M :S(L)].M |= ψA ⇔ ⊢IL ψ
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Proof. By Theorem 1 it is enough to show
⊢ML ψ
A ⇔ ⊢IL ψ
(⇒) If ⊢ML ψ
A then also ⊢IL ψ
A for any interpretation of A including False. It is easy to prove,
by induction on the structure of ψ that ⊢IL ψ
False ⇔ ψ.
(⇐) This is Friedman’s Theorem.
We will prove Theorem 1 by defining an effective procedure that builds a tree of evidence
structures (defined below) starting with an initial evidence structure formed from the uniform
evidence term. We show that any evidence structure is either trivial (and therefore a leaf of the
ultimate minimal logic proof) or else can be transformed into a finite number (either one or two)
of derived evidence structures, and the transformation tells us what rule of minimal logic to use at
that step of the proof.
Theorem 1 will then follow from the fact that this effective procedure must terminate and yield
a finite proof tree. The termination of the procedure for an arbitrary term evd ∈
⋂
M∈S(L)M(ψ) is
a strong claim. The evidence need not be a fully-typed term with all of its subterms typed, so there
can be sections of “dead code” in the evidence that are not typable and may not be normalizable.
Nevertheless the fact that the evidence is uniformly in the type M(ψ) implies that the “dead code”
is irrelevant and our procedure will terminate, but the proof of this fact (which follows in classical
logic from Ko¨nig’s lemma) in intuitionistic mathematics seems to require Brouwer’s Fan Theorem.
If we assume that the uniform evidence term is fully normalized, then we can make a direct
inductive argument for termination of our proof procedure. Since the evidence constructed from
a proof in minimal logic is fully normalizable, this results in an alternate version of completeness
that we state as follows
Theorem 2. Any ψ ∈MF(L) is provable in minimal logic (⊢ML ψ) if and only if there is a fully
normalized term evd in the type
⋂
M∈S(L)M(ψ).
We work only in intuitionistic logic, so we must avoid the use of excluded middle for propositions
that are not decidable and in particular we can not assume the proposition evd ∈M(ψ) is decidable.
Because of this, we will need the concept that evidence term evd is consistent with the type M(G).
One notion of consistency that is sufficent for our proof is that there is no structure M for which
evd 6∈ M(G). However, the resulting proof is logically more complex than the one we give below
where consistency is based on interpeting the types in finitary structures.
3 Finitary types and structures
Definition 5. Types A and B are equipollent (written A ∼ B) if there is a bijection f : A → B.
A type T is finite if ∃k : N. T ∼ Nk (where Nk is the type of numbers in the range 0 ≤ i < k).
Note that if T is finite then equality in T is decidable and there is a list LT that enumerates
T , i.e. contains all the members of T with no repeats. Using LT , any function f : T → S can be
converted to a table
graph(f) =map(λx.〈x, f(x)〉, LT )
Using the decidable equality in T we can define a table lookup function and recover the function
f = lookup(graph(f))
Definition 6. We write t ↓ to say that term t computes to a value (a canonical form).
The bar type T¯ is the type of all terms t such that (t ↓)⇒ (t ∈ T ).
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A function f : Term → T¯ is strict if for all terms t
(f(t) ↓)⇒ (t ↓)
A type T is a value type if every member of T converges to a value.
A bar type T¯ is not a value type, but even without bar types, a rich type theory that includes
intersection types or quotient types will have some types that are not value types.
Definition 7. A type T is a retract if there is a strict function iT of type Term → T¯ such that
∀t : T. iT (t) = t ∈ T
or equivalently
iT = id ∈ (T → T )
A type T is finitary if it is a finite, value type and a retract.
A structure M ∈ S(L) is finitary if M(D) is finitary and the types M(Ri)(d1, . . . , dni) assigned
to the atomic formulas are finitary.
We let abort be a fixed term that has no redex but is not a canonical form. For example abort
could be 0(0) or true + 5 or a primitive. The term abort does not converge to a value. We use
this to construct simple examples of finitary types.
Example 1. The type Nk is a finitary type. The retraction iNk is
λt.(if 0 ≤ t & t < k then t else abort).
Example 2. The type Unit with a single canonical member ⋆ is a finitary type. The retraction is
λt.(if t == ⋆ then t else abort).
These examples depend on the existence of primitive computations that recognize the canonical
forms of the intended members of the type. We mention here some additional assumptions about the
underlying computation system on which our proof of completeness depends. These assumptions
are satisfied by the computation system used by Nuprl, but our proof could easily be modified to
work for type theories based on different primitive computations. 11
Assumption 1. The only primitive redex involving a pair 〈t1, t2〉 is
spread(〈t1, t2〉;x, y.B(x, y)) 7→ B(t1, t2)
The only primitive redex involving inl t is
decide(inl t;x.B(x); y.C(y)) 7→ B(t)
The only primitive redex involving inr t is
decide(inr t;x.B(x); y.C(y)) 7→ C(t)
The only primitive redex involving λx.B(x) is
(λx.B(x))(t) 7→ B(t)
11For example, the computation system could have primitive projection functions pi1 and pi2 rather than the spread
primitive. It could have primitives for isl, outl, isr, and outr rather than the decide primitive. Our construction
would be easily modified to accomodate such differences.
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Lemma 1. If A and B are finitary then A+B is finitary. If A is finitary and for all a ∈ A, B(a)
is finitary then the types a :A→ B(a) and a :A×B(a) are both finitary.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the types are finite, value types. The retraction maps i,
j, and k for A+B , a :A→ B(a), and a :A×B(a) are
i(t) = decide(t;x.iA(x); y.iB(y))
j(t) = lookup(graph(λa.iB(a)(t(a))))
k(t) = spread(t;x, y.(λa.(λb.〈a, b〉)(val iB(a)(y)))(val iA(x)))
The operation f(valx) is a call-by-value apply, so for the retraction k(t) to converge, the term t
must evaluate to a pair 〈x, y〉, the value a = iA(x) must converge, and the value b = iB(a)(y) must
converge, before the pair 〈a, b〉 ∈ a :A×B(a) is formed.
Corollary 2. If M ∈ S(L) is finitary and ψ ∈ F(L) then M(ψ) is finitary.
Definition 8. We abbreviate (λa.〈a, y〉)(val x) as 〈val x, y〉. This operation forms a pair only after
the first component has been evaluated.
Definition 9. A term t is consistent with a retract type T if iT (t) ∈ T or, equivalently, if iT (t) ↓ .
If A is a retract then a function f : A → B is tight if the domain of f contains only terms
consistent with A, i.e. if for all terms t
(f(t) ↓)⇒ (iA(t) ↓).
Lemma 2. If f has type A→ B and A is a retract, then there is a tight function f ′ = f ∈ (A→ B).
Proof. Let f ′ = f ◦ iA where iA is the retraction onto A. Since iA is the identity on A, we have
f ′ = f ∈ (A→ B). The domain of f ′ contains only terms in the domain of iA.
Definition 10. For any σ : V0 → T0 that is an injection from a finite subset V0 ⊂ Var into a
finitary type T0 we define a finitary L-structure Mtriv(σ) by
M(D) = T0
M(v) = σ(v)
M(Ri) = λx1, . . . , xni .Unit .
Lemma 3. For any ψ ∈ MF(L) with free variables in V0, Mtriv |= ψ.
Proof. The structure Mtriv(σ) assigns to every atomic formula the non-empty type Unit . It is then
clear thatMtriv(σ) assigns a non-empty type to every minimal logic formula ψ and henceMtriv |= ψ.
This would not be true for general first-order formulas that include negation and False.
4 Evidence structures
We will use the concept of an evidence structure to build a bridge between uniform evidence terms
and proofs. An evidence structure will have three parts, a context H, a goal G, and evidence
term evd. The context H will include some declarations of the form di : D where di ∈ Var (the
variables in F(L)), but it will also include declarations of the form vi : A where A ∈ MF(L)
is a subformula of the orginal goal ψ and vi is a variable chosen from another set of variables
Var ′ = v0 , v1 , v2 , . . . disjoint from Var = {d0 , d1 , . . . }. The context H will also contain constraints
of the form f(val d) = t where f ∈ Var ′ and term t is a pattern over H.
9
Definition 11. Given a set H of variable declarations v :T , the set of patterns over H is the set
of typed terms defined inductively by:
1. Any v :T ∈ H is a pattern.
2. If ptn1 :A and ptn2 :B are patterns then the following are patterns:
• 〈ptn1, ptn2〉 : (A×B)
• inl ptn1 : (A+B)
• inr ptn2 : (A+B).
Definition 12. A typing H over L is a list of declarations of one of the two forms:
1. d :D where d ∈ Var.
2. v :A where v ∈ Var ′ and A ∈ MF(L) such that every free variable d of A, is declared in H.
A model M of H is a finitary structure for L extended so that for each v :T in H, M(v) ∈M(T ).
Definition 13. An implies constraint on a typing H is an equation
vi = constant(t)
where vi :A⇒ B ∈ H and t is a pattern of type B. The constraint is stratified if for any variable vj
in pattern t, i < j. The constraint is unique in H if there is no other constraint vi = constant(t
′)
in H. A model M of H satisfies the constraint if M(vi) = λx.M(t) ∈ (M(A)→M(B)).
A forall constraint is an equation
vi(val d) = t
where d :D ∈ H and for some formula P ∈ MF(L), vi : ∀z. P ∈ H and t is a pattern of type
P (d) over H. The constraint is stratified if for any variable vj in pattern t, i < j. The constraint
is unique in H if there is no other constraint vi(val d) = t
′ in H. A model M of H satisfies the
constraint if M(vi)(M(d)) =M(t) ∈M(P (d)).
An evidence context H over L is a list of declarations and unique, stratified constraints such
that the declarations are a typing over L and the constraints are constraints on that typing. M is
a model of context H if it is a model of the typing H that satisfies all the constraints. We write
M |= H to say that M is a model of context H; note that this means that M ∈ S(L) and M is
finitary.
Definition 14. A model M |= H is tight if for every f :A→ B ∈ H, the function M(f) is tight.
We write M |=t H when M is tight.
Lemma 4. Every evidence context H over L has a tight model.
Proof. Let V0 be the variables di for which di : D ∈ H. We first choose a finitary type T0 and
an injection σ : V0 → T0 (we can use Nk for k > |V0|). We construct the model M by extending
the model Mtriv(σ), choosing values for the variables that satisfy all the constraints. Since the
constraints are stratified, we choose values for the variables in reverse order. Let vj ∈ Var
′ be a
variable with a declaration vj : T ∈ H and assume that we have chosen values for all variables vk
in H with j < k. Assign a value to all patterns t all of whose variables vk have k > j recursively
as follows: M(〈p1, p2〉) = 〈M(p1),M(p2)〉, M(inl p) = inl M(p), M(inr p) = inr M(p).
If T is ∀x. P for some P , then for each di ∈ V0 we choose a value wi ∈M(P (di)) as follows: If
there is a (unique) constraint vj(val di) = ti in H then we use wi = M(ti) ∈ M(P (di)) (which is
defined since values for the variables in pattern ti have already been chosen). Otherwise we choose
wi from the non-empty type M(P (di)). Since the values M(di) are all distinct members of the
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finite type M(D) = T0, we set the value of vj to be a function of type x : M(D)→M(P (x)) that
maps each M(di) to wi. This function is lookup([〈M(di), wi〉|di ∈ V0]).
If T is A⇒ B then if there is a (unique) implies constraint vj = constant(t) then let w =M(t)
and choose the constant function λx.w made tight by applying lemma 2. If there is no constraint
on vj then we choose any member of the non-empty type M(A) → M(B) and make the chosen
function tight by applying lemma 2.
Otherwise there are no constraints on vj , and Mtriv(σ)(T ) is non-empty by lemma 3 so we may
choose a value for vj from this type.
Definition 15. An evidence structure is a triple H |= G, evd where
1. H is an evidence context.
2. G ∈ MF(L) .
3. for every M ∈ S(L), if M |=t H then M(evd) is consistent with M(G).
We write t[v := e] for the result of substitution of e for variable v in term t, and we write (H |=
G, evd)[v := e] for the result of substitution of e for v everywhere in the evidence structure H |=
G, evd.
Observation 1. If evd is uniform evidence for a formula ψ ∈ MF(L) then
|= ψ, evd
is an evidence structure.
5 Derivation rules for evidence structures
We now define a set of sixteen derivation rules by which we derive evidence structures from evidence
structures. We will prove that
1. If H |= G, evd is an evidence structure, then evd computes to evd′ that is canonical or has a
principal argument that is a variable.
2. H |= G, evd′ is an evidence structure that it matches one of the sixteen derivation rules.
3. This defines a recursive procedure on evidence structures that results in a tree of derived
evidence structures.
4. The tree derived from (|= ψ, evd) is finite, and from it we can construct a minimal logic proof
of ψ.
The first seven derivation rules shown in Figure 1 match evidence structures where the evidence
is in canonical form.
Definition 16. An evidence derivation rule is valid if for any evidence structure matching the
pattern above the line, the derived instances below the line are evidence structures.
Lemma 5. The rules in Figure 1 are valid.
Proof. Since these rules do not add constraints to the context, we only have to prove that the
derived evidence term is consistent with the derived goal.
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∧pair
H |= G1 ∧G2, 〈evd1, evd2〉
H |= G1, evd1 H |= G2, evd2
∃pair
H |= ∃x.G, 〈evd1, evd2〉
H |= ∃x.G, 〈val evd1, evd2〉
∃val pair
d :D ∈ H |= ∃x.G, 〈val d, evd〉 (d a variable)
H |= G[x := d], evd
∨inl
H |= G1 ∨G2, inl evd
H |= G1, evd
∨inr
H |= G1 ∨G2, inr evd
H |= G2, evd
⇒λ
H |= G1 ⇒ G2, λx.evd
H;x :G1 |= G2, evd
∀λ
H |= ∀y.G, λx.evd
H; d :D |= G[y := d], evd
The bound variable in λx.evd in Rightarrowλ is renamed to avoid variables in H and the variable
d in ∀λ is fresh.
Figure 1: Rules for evidence structures with canonical evidence.
For the rule ∧pair, suppose M |= H, then 〈evd1, evd2〉 is consistent with M(G1 ∧G2). So,
iM(G1)×M(G2)(〈evd1, evd2〉) ↓ ⇒
(λa.(λb.〈a, b〉)(val iM(G2)(evd2)))(val iM(G1)(evd1)) ↓ ⇒
iM(G1)(evd1) ↓ ∧ iM(G2)(evd2) ↓
For the rule ⇒ λ, suppose M |= H;x :G1, then λx.evd is consistent with M(G1 ⇒ G2). So,
iM(G1)→M(G2)(λx.evd) ↓ ⇒
graph(λa.iM(G2)(evd(a))) ↓ ⇒
∀a ∈M(G1). iM(G2)(evd(a)) ↓ ⇒
iM(G2)(evd(M(x))) ↓
The proofs of validity of the other rules for canonical evidence are similar to these.
The remaining rules match evidence that is not in canonical form. If a term is not in canonical
form but some instance of it will compute to canonical form then the term must have a subterm
that is a variable and the computation depends on the value of that variable in order to proceed.
We call such a variable the principal variable and any subterm in such a position a principal subterm
Definition 17. The principal subterm principal (t) of term t is defined inductively by:
principal (decide(d;x.a; y.b)) = principal (d)
principal (spread(p;x, y.b)) = principal (p)
principal (f(b)) = principal (f)
principal (f(val b)) = principal (b)
principal (〈val a, b〉) = principal (a)
principal (t) = t, otherwise
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var
H1; v : G;H2 |= G, v
decide
H1; c :A ∨B;H2 |= G, evd(decide(c;x.a; y.b))
(H1;x :A;H2 |= G, evd(a))[c := inl x] (H1; y :B;H2 |= G, evd(b))[c := inr y]
∧spread
H1; p :A ∧B;H2 |= G, evd(spread(p;x, y.t))
(H1;x :A; y :B;H2 |= G, evd(t))[p := 〈x, y〉]
∃spread
H1; p : ∃z. P ;H2 |= G, evd(spread(p;x, y.t))
(H1; d :D; y :P [z := x];H2 |= G, evd(t))[p := 〈d, y〉]
apply const
f = constant(v) ∈ H |= G, evd(f (t))
H |= G, evd(v)
⇒apply
6 ∃v.f = constant(v) ∈ H1; f :A⇒ B;H2 |= G, evd(f (t))
H1; f :A⇒ B;H2 |= A, t H1; f :A⇒ B;H2; v :B; f = constant(v) |= G, evd(v)
∀apply
f :∀z. P ∈ H |= G, evd(f (t))
H |= G, evd(f(val t))
apply model
f(val d) = t ∈ H |= G, evd(f(val d))
H |= G, evd(t)
∀cbv
6 ∃t. f(val d) = t ∈ H, {f :∀z. P, d :D} ⊆ H |= G, evd(f(val d))
H;w :P [z := d]; f(val d) = w |= G, evd(w)
The bound variables, d, x, and y, in rules decide and spread are renamed to avoid variables in H.
The variables, v and w , introduced in rules ⇒apply and cbv new are fresh.
Figure 2: Rules for evidence structure with non canonical evidence.
We write t(x) when x is the principal subterm of t(x).
The rules shown in Figure 2 match on the operator that is applied to the principal variable in
the evidence. When a fresh variable from Var ′ is needed, we take the least index greater than all
the variables already in use. This will guarantee that all the constraints remain stratified.
Lemma 6. The constraints in the evidence structures derived from the rules in Figure 2 are unique,
stratified constraints.
Proof. Only the rules ⇒apply and ∀cbv add new constraints and they apply only when there is
not already a similar constraint. The constraints are changed only by the rules (decide, spread,
and ⇒apply) that substitute a pattern (inl x, inr y, or 〈x, y〉) for a variable. In each case, the
new variables introduced are fresh, and substituting a pattern for a variable in a pattern results in
a pattern, so all the constraints remain unique, stratified patterns.
Lemma 7. The rules in Figure 2 are valid
Proof. Because it depends on the restriction to tight models, we consider first the proof of
⇒apply
6 ∃v.f = constant(v) ∈ H1; f :A⇒ B;H2 |= G, evd(f (t))
H1; f :A⇒ B;H2 |= A, t H1; f :A⇒ B;H2; v :B; f = constant(v) |= G, evd(v)
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Assume that the structure above the line is an evidence structure, and let M |=t H1; f :A⇒ B;H2.
Then M(evd(f (t))) is consistent with M(G). Since iM(G) is strict, this implies that M(t) is in the
domain of M(f) and since M is tight, M(t) is consistent with M(A). This proves the validity of
the first derived structure H1; f :A⇒ B;H2 |= A, t
If M |=t H1; f : A ⇒ B;H2; v :B; f = constant(v) then the model M is also a tight model
of H1; f :A ⇒ B;H2 so M(evd(f (t))) is consistent with M(G) and this implies that M(evd(v))
is consistent with M(G) because M(f(t)) must converge to M(v). This proves the validity of the
second derived structure and finishes the proof of the rule ⇒apply
Consider next the rule
∀cbv
6 ∃t. f(val d) = t ∈ H, {f :∀z. P, d :D} ⊆ H |= G, evd(f(val d))
H;w :P [z := d]; f(val d) = w |= G, evd(w)
If M |=t H;w : P [z := d]; f(val d) = w then M |=t H and because M(D) is a value type,
M(f(val d)) = M(f(d)) = M(w) ∈ M(P (d)). Since M(evd(f(val d))) is consistent with M(G)
and iM(G) is strict, this implies that M(evd(w)) is consistent with M(G). So ∀cbv is a valid rule.
Consider next the rule
∃spread
H1; p : ∃z. P ;H2 |= G, evd(spread(p;x, y.t))
(H1; d :D; y :P [z := x];H2 |= G, evd(t))[p := 〈d, y〉]
If M |=t (H1; d :D; y :P [z := x];H2)[p := 〈d, y〉] then the model
M ′ =M [p := 〈M(d),M(y)〉]
is a tight model of H1; p : ∃z. P ;H2, so M
′(evd(spread(p;x, y.t))) is consistent with M ′(G). This
implies that M(evd(t))[p := 〈d, y〉]) is consistent with M ′(G) =M(G).
The proofs for the validity of the remaining rules are similar to these.
Lemma 8. If H |= G, evd is an evidence structure, and evd′ is obtained by computing evd until it
is canonical or has a principal variable, then H |= G, evd′ is an evidence structure.
Proof. IfM |=t H thenM(evd) is consistent withM(G) so (iM(G)(evd) ↓). This implies (iM(G)(evd
′) ↓
) since the computations are the same.
Lemma 9. If H |= G, evd is an evidence structure, and evd is canonical or a principal variable,
then H |= G, evd matches one of the sixteen rules in Figure 1 and Figure 2
Proof. By Lemma 4 there is a tight model M |=t H. Thus, M(evd) is consistent with M(G). If
evd is canonical, then H |= G, evd must match one of the rules in Figure 1 because the type M(G)
must be a product, union, or function type.
If evd has a principal variable v then v : T ∈ H for some T ∈ MF(L) and M(v) ∈ M(T ).
Since v is principal and iM(G) is strict, the computation iM(G)(M(evd)) must reduce the subterm
ofM(evd) containingM(v). SinceM(T ) must be a product, union, or function type, only a spread,
decide, apply, or call-by-value apply redex can apply. Therefore one of the rules in Figure 2 must
match H |= G, evd.
The preceding lemmas show that there is a well defined procedure that starts with the evi-
dence structure (|= ψ, evd) constructed from uniform evidence for ψ and recursively builds a tree
of evidence structures by alternating computation of evd until it is canonical or has a principal
variable with matching the evidence structure against the sixteen derivation rules and applying the
derivation.
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It is routine to check that each derivation corresponds to a proof rule of minimal logic. In our
implementation of the proof procedure (shown in the Appendix) we need only the evidence term
evd and the constraints (which we call the “model”) because the typing and the goal are just the
current hypotheses and goal of the sequent being proved. From this information the recursive Nuprl
tactic decides which derivation rule to apply (or that it needs to compute the evidence term) and
then updates the evidence and constraints and uses one of the primitive logical rules to get the
next typing hypotheses and next goal term.
Our Theorem 1 is proved once we establish that the recursive procedure terminates.
6 Termination of the Proof procedure
We first show termination under the assumption that evd is fully normalized, which will establish
Theorem 2.
Lemma 10. If evd is fully normalized then the evidence structure generation procedure terminates.
Proof. Let nc(evd) be the number of occurrences of decide, spread, or apply operators in term
evd. Let cbv(evd) be the number of occurrences of the call-by-value apply operator. Let npr(evd)
be the number of occurrences of the 〈x, y〉 operator . Let cn(evd) be the number of occurrences of
the 〈valx, y〉, inl x, or inr y operators .
We prove termination by induction on the lexicographically ordered tuple
〈nc(evd), cbv(evd), npr(evd), cn(evd)〉
Each rule in Figure 1 changes evd to a subterm of evd and removes at least one of the counted
operators except for rule ∃pair which changes a 〈x, y〉 into a 〈val x, y〉, so the measure decreases in
each of these steps.
Some of the rules in Figure 2 reduce the measure by replacing a subterm of evd that includes a
decide, spread, or apply operator by a variable and then substituting a pattern into the result.
This reduces the nc(evd) count and may increase only the npr(evd) and cn(evd) counts because
patterns have only 〈x, y〉 , inl x, or inr y operators . Thus, in every case it is easily checked that
the measure decreases.
It remains to show that in the computation steps that compute evd until it is canonical or has
a principal variable we can in fact fully normalize the evidence term and that this will not increase
the measure.
If evd is fully normalized, then the only rules which derive evidence that may not be fully
normalized are those that substitute a pattern. The resulting term evd′, which has some pattern
ptn in some places where evd had a variable, can contain only spread, decide, apply, or call-by-value
apply redexes. When these are reduced, they result only in sub-patterns of ptn being substituted for
variables. Thus, by induction on the size of ptn we can show that normalization of evd′ terminates
and does not increase the measure.
The proof of termination for the general case where evd is not assumed to be fully normalized
uses Brouwer’s Fan Theorem. For that proof we need the following definitions and lemmas.
Definition 18. A derivation rule is constant domain if it does not add a new variable di :D to
the derived contexts.
All of the derivation rules in Figures 1 and 2 are constant domain except for the rules ∀λ and
∃spread.
Definition 19. A derivation is a ψ-deriviation if it is an instance of one of the derivation rules
where the formulas in the context H and goal G are instances of subformulas of ψ.
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Definition 20. Context H ′ is a constant domain ψ-extension of context H (written H <ψcd H
′)
if H ′ can be obtained from H by applying ψ-derivations that are instances of constant domain
derivation rules.
Context H is a maximal ψ-context if there is no proper H ′ with H <ψcd H
′.
Lemma 11. For any formula ψ ∈ MF(L), and any context H there are only finitely many H ′
such that H <ψcd H
′
Proof. Let D0 be the set of variables di :D ∈ H. Repeated application of the constant domain
ψ-derivations will add new declarations and constraints v :P (d); f(val d) = v for all the universally
quantified declarations f : ∀x. P (x) and every d ∈ D0. These new declarations will in turn be
instantiated with every d ∈ D0. Any declarations of the form v :A ∨ B will generate two derived
extensions where v is replaced by either inl x for x :A or by inr y for y :B. Declarations of the
form p :A ∧B will be replaced by x :A; y :B and p replaced by 〈x, y〉. Every subformula of ψ may
be added to the context with its free variables replaced by members of D0. But for a finite D0 and
fixed formula ψ there are only finitely many such extensions.
Corollary 3. For any context H there is a finite, non-empty set of maximal ψ-contexts H ′ such
that H <ψcd H
′
Definition 21. The one step ψ-extension of H is obtained from H by adding di :D for the least
i ∈ N for which di is not in H, then applying the ∃spread rule to add new domain elements for
every existentially quantified formula in H.
Context H ′ is a next ψ-extension of H if it is a maximal constant domain ψ-extension of the
one step ψ-extension of H.
SM(ψ), the spread of symbolic models of ψ is the tree with the empty context at the root and
the successors of node H being the next ψ-extensions of H.
An infinite path through SM(ψ) describes a freely-chosen model M with M(D) = Var . In this
model the evidence term evd must compute evidence for M(ψ) and we use the termination of this
computation to bar the spread SM(ψ). Brouwer’s Fan Theorem then gives a uniform bar and this
implies that our proof procedure terminates on evd and produces a minimal logic proof of ψ.
Definition 22. Let α be an infinite path in SM(ψ). The computation c(α,ψ, evd, n) where n > 0,
is defined by computing evd in the context α(n) (a maximal context along path alpha) to a term
evd′ that is canonical or has a principal variable. The computation proceeds by cases:
• if evd′ is a variable v and v :ψ is in the context then halt and return n.
• If evd′ is inl evd1 and ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 then the computation proceeds with c(α,ψ1, evd1, n).
• If evd′ is inr evd2 and ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 then the computation proceeds with c(α,ψ2, evd2, n).
• If evd′ is 〈evd1, evd2〉 and ψ = ψ1∧ψ2 then return the maximum of the dovetailed or sequential
computation of both c(α,ψ1, evd1, n) and c(α,ψ2, evd2, n).
• If evd′ is λx. evd1 and ψ = ψ1 ⇒ ψ2 then since the context α(n) is maximal there is a
declaration v :ψ1, so proceed with c(α,ψ2, evd1[x := v], n).
• If evd′ is λx. evd1 and ψ = ∀x. ψ2 then in α(n + 1) a fresh dj :D was added so proceed with
c(α,ψ2[x := dj ], evd1[x := dj ], n+ 1).
• If evd′ has a principal variable v that is the argument to a decide operator, then the maximal
context specifies that v = inl x or v = inl y, so replace v and proceed with the computation.
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• If evd′ has a principal variable v that is the argument to a spread operator, then if the
maximal context specifies that v = 〈x, y〉 replace v and proceed with the computation (this
must happen if v :A ∧B in the context). Otherwise, if v :∃z. P (z) in the context then in the
next context, α(n+ 1), v will be replaced by a pair 〈dj , w〉 where dj :D is new and w :P (dj),
so replace v by 〈dj , v〉 to get evd
′′ and proceed with c(α,ψ, evd′′ , n+ 1).
• If evd′ has a principal variable v where the principal subterm is v(dn) then dn :D is in the
context, and since the context is maximal there is a constraint v(dn) = w in the context, so
replace the subterm v(dn) with w and proceed with the computation.
• Otherwise abort the computation.
Lemma 12. If evd is uniform evidence for ψ then the computation c(α,ψ, evd, n + 1) converges.
Proof. Any path α through SM(ψ) defines a model M in which evd ∈M(ψ)
Corollary 4. The proof procedure terminates and this establishesTheorem 1
Proof. For any α, the computation n = c(α,ψ, evd, 1) converges. This defines a bar on the fan
SM(ψ). By Brouwer’s theorem, there is a uniform bar N . The length of any branch in the tree of
evidence structures produced by the proof procedure is bounded by c(α,ψ, evd, 1) for some path α.
Thus the height of the tree of evidence structures is bounded by N . Since it is finitely branching,
it is finite.
We have implemented the proof procedure as a tactic in Nuprl and tested it on a number of
examples. We can construct evidence terms from the extracts of Nuprl proofs or construct them
by hand. We can then modify the evidence terms using any operators we like so that the resulting
term is computationally equivalent to the original. Thus we can introduce abbreviations (which is
equivalent to using the cut rule) and use operators such as π1 and π2 (which Nuprl displays as fst
and snd as in ML) and (if c then a else b) that are defined in terms of the primitive spread and
decide operators. In appendix 8 we show one such example and describe the implementation of
the tactic.
7 Observations and Corollaries
If evd1 is uniform evidence for ψ1 and evd2 is uniform evidence for ψ1 ⇒ ψ then the application
evd2(evd1) is uniform evidence for ψ. This observation gives us a semantic proof of cut elimination
for first order minimal logic.
Lemma 13. If ψ ∈ MF(L) is provable in minimal logic with the cut rule (⊢MLC ψ) then ⊢ML ψ
Proof. The evidence term extracted from the proof ⊢MLC ψ is uniform evidence for ψ. ByTheo-
rem 1, ⊢ML ψ
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8 Appendix
⊢ ∀[A,D:Type]. ∀[R,Eq:D → D → P].
((∀x,y,z:D. (R[x;y] ⇒ (R[y;z] ∨ Eq[y;z]) ⇒ R[x;z]))
⇒ (∀x:D. (R[x;x] ⇒ A))
⇒ (∀x:D. ∃y:D. R[x;y])
⇒ (∃m:D. ∀x:D. ((Eq[x;m] ⇒ A) ⇒ R[x;m]))
⇒ A)
BY EvidenceTac ⌈λTrans,Irr,Unbdd,MxEx.
let m = fst(MxEx) in
let bounds = snd(MxEx) in
let y,ygtr = Unbdd m
in let loop = Trans m y m ygtr in
let F = λx.(Irr m (loop x)) in
F (inl (bounds y (λeq.(F (inr eq )))) )⌉·
THENA Auto
Figure 3: Example minimal logic proof from evidence
This example shows how equality can be represented as an atomic relation symbol. The formula
states (in minimal logic) that an irreflexive, transtitive relation that is unbounded cannot have a
maximal element. We have introduced a number of abbreviations into the evidence term to illustrate
the fact that the proof procedure does not require normalized terms.
The tactic EvidenceTac is shown in Figure 4. It uses the evidence to generate the proof. In
Nuprl, some of the primitive rules of minimal logic (hypothesis, and, or, implies, forall, exists
introduction and elimination) create auxilliary subgoals to show that the rules have been applied
to well-formed propositions. In the proof in Figure 3 the tactic THENA Auto is used to prove these
auxilliary goals.
let EvidenceTac evd =
-- helper functions here --
letrec evdProofTac M evd p =
let op = opid_of_term evd in
if member op ‘‘variable pair inl inr lambda‘‘ then
canonical op M evd p
else
let t = get_principal_arg_with_context evd in
if is_variable_term (subtermn 1 t) then
let op = opid_of_term t in
if member op ‘‘spread decide callbyvalue apply‘‘ then
noncanonical op t M evd p
else (AddDebugLabel ‘arg not reducible‘ p)
else let evd’ = apply_conv (ComputeToC []) evd in
if alpha_equal_terms evd’ evd then Id p
else evdProofTac M evd’ p
in Repeat UniformCD
THEN evdProofTac [] evd
;;
Figure 4: Tactic code for Proof from Uniform Evidence
The basic structure of the tactic is to take off the uniform quantifiers and then start the proof
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procedure from evidence. If the evidence is canonical it uses one of the rules for that case, otherwise
if there is a principal variable it uses one of the rules for non-canonical evidence, and otherwise it
computes the evidence term. The helper code include the tactic for taking off a uniform quantifier,
let UniformCD p = if is_term ‘uall‘ (concl p)
then (D 0 THENA Auto) p
else Fail p in
let mk_cbv_pair t1 t2 =
subst [‘x’,t1;‘y’,t2] ⌈let a := x in
<a, y>⌉ in
let mk_cbv_ap fun arg =
subst [‘arg’,arg;‘f’,fun] ⌈let a := arg in
f a⌉ in
let do_update v pattern redex result evd M =
let sub = [v, pattern] in
subst sub (replace_subterm redex result evd),
map (\(ap,val). (ap, subst sub val)) M in
let lookup M t =
let test (ap, val) =
if alpha_equal_terms ap t then val else fail in
inl (first_value test M) ? inr () in
Figure 5: Code for helper functions
functions for forming the call-by-value pair and apply terms, and code for substituting a pattern
into the evidence and constraints (here called the model) in order to eliminate a redex from the
non-canonical evidence. The lookup function checks for the existence of a constraint on a given
apply term from the evidence.
canonical op M evd p =
if op = ‘variable‘ then
let x = dest_variable evd in
let n = get_number_of_declaration p x in NthHyp n p
else if op = ‘pair‘ then
let evd1,evd2 = dest_pair evd in
if is_term ‘and‘ (concl p) then
(D 0 THENL [evdProofTac M evd1; evdProofTac M evd2]) p
else if is_term ‘variable‘ evd1 then
(With evd1 (D 0) THENM (evdProofTac M evd2)) p
else (evdProofTac M (mk_cbv_pair evd1 evd2)) p
else if op = ‘inl‘ then
(OrLeft THENM (evdProofTac M (dest_inl evd))) p
else if op = ‘inr‘ then
(OrRight THENM (evdProofTac M (dest_inr evd))) p
else let x,t = dest_lambda evd in
let z = maybe_new_var x (declared_vars p) in
let evd1 = if z = x then t else subst [x, mvt z] t in
SeqOnM [D 0 ; RenameVar z (-1); evdProofTac M evd1] p
Figure 6: Code for canonical evidence
The code for the canonical case comes from the rules in Figure 1. In each case, the corresponding
proof rule of the logic is invoked with the tactic D 0. To make life easier for the users, Nuprl has
organized all the primitive rules into one tactic named D (for decompose). The number 0 indicates
that we are applying a primitive rule to decompose the conclusion of the sequent rather than one
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of the hypotheses. This is because the canonical evidence always indicates that the next proof step
is an introduction rule.
noncanonical op t M evd p =
if op = ‘spread‘ then
let t1,bt = dest_spread t in
let v = dest_variable t1 in
let [x;y],body = rename_bvs p bt in
let pattern = mk_pair_term (mvt x) (mvt y) in
let evd1, M’ = do_update v pattern t body evd M in
let n = get_number_of_declaration p v in
Seq [D n
; RenameVar x n
; RenameVar y (n+1)
; evdProofTac M’ evd1] p
else if op = ‘decide‘ then
let t1, bt1, bt2 = dest_decide t in
let v = dest_variable t1 in
let [x],case1 = rename_bvs p bt1 in
let pattern1 = mk_inl_term (mvt x) in
let evd1, M1 = do_update v pattern1 t case1 evd M in
let [y],case2 = rename_bvs p bt2 in
let pattern2 = mk_inr_term (mvt y) in
let evd2, M2 = do_update v pattern2 t case2 evd M in
let n = get_number_of_declaration p v in
(D n THENL [ RenameVar x n THEN evdProofTac M1 evd1
; RenameVar y n THEN evdProofTac M2 evd2
]) p
else if op = ‘callbyvalue‘ then
let kind, arg, ([x], B) = dest_callbyvalue t in
let B’ = subst [x, arg] B in
evdProofTac M (replace_subterm t B’ evd ) p
else apply_case t M evd p
Figure 7: Code for non-canonical evidence
The code for the non-canonical case comes from the rules in Figure 2. In these cases we use an
elimination rule, indicated by the fact that the tactic calls on D n where n is the hypothesis number
for the declaration of the principal variable. The code for the apply case is shown in Figure 8.
When the type of the declared variable (T = h n p) is an implies we use the rule ⇒apply that
adds a constraint that the declared function is a constant function. In this implementation we
substitute the constant function for the variable and eliminate it entirely. We can prove that this
results in behavior that is equivalent to the derivation rules.
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apply_case t M evd p =
let fun,arg = dest_apply t in
let v = dest_variable fun in
let n = get_number_of_declaration p v in
let T = h n p in
if is_term ‘implies‘ T then
let x = maybe_new_var ‘x’ (declared_vars p) in
let pattern = mk_lambda_term ‘z’ (mvt x) in
let evd1, M’ = do_update v pattern t (mvt x) evd M in
((D n THEN Fold ‘implies‘ n)
THENL [ evdProofTac M arg
; RenameVar x (-1) THEN evdProofTac M’ evd1]) p
else if is_term ‘all‘ T then
if is_variable_term arg then
let w = dest_variable arg in
let ans = lookup M t in
if isl ans then
evdProofTac M (replace_subterm t (outl ans) evd) p
else
let x = maybe_new_var ‘x’ (declared_vars p) in
let evd1 = replace_subterm t (mvt x) evd in
let M’ = (t , (mvt x)).M in
(SimpleInstHyp arg n THENM
(Seq [ RenameVar x (-1); evdProofTac M’ evd1])) p
else let evd’ = replace_subterm t (mk_cbv_ap fun arg) evd in
evdProofTac M evd’ p
else (AddDebugLabel ‘fun in apply has wrong type‘ p)
Figure 8: Code for apply case of non-canonical evidence
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